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Using political sanctions to discourage intergroup attacks: Social identity and authority legitimacy 
 
Abstract  
De Dreu and Gross offer novel solutions to discouraging attackers via political sanctions. We 
offer insights from social psychological and criminological research on when such sanctions 
would work and when they could backfire. We argue that the influence of such sanctioning 
ultimately rests upon the extent to which such authorities can claim to represent the society they 
serve. 
 
---- 
 
Authorities have a distinct position in our societies in that a mere appointment to such duty 
warrants a form of power and influence over society’s behaviours. People usually obey 
authorities if they perceive them as legitimate (Tyler, 2006) and policies and reforms introduced 
by political authorities have a direct influence on social norms (Guimond et al., 2013; Tankard & 
Paluck, 2016). In their article, De Dreu and Gross suggest that authorities are among solutions to 
prevent grave intergroup conflict by introducing political sanctions, discouraging potential 
attackers. In this commentary, we elaborate on this argument by considering when political 
sanctioning can be effective in preventing conflict and when it could backfire, provoking reactive 
attacks further. We argue that the extent to which authority is perceived to represent people they 
are meant to serve is key in the extent to which political sanctions are effective. 
 
On one level, the effect of political sanctioning on behaviour seems straightforward: sanctions 
discourage behaviours by altering the cost-benefit considerations such that unwanted behaviours 
become more costly to the actor. From this point of view, it does not matter what kind of 
relationship exists between the authority and potential attacker so long the latter is afraid of losing 
resources valuable to their group should they disobey the former. These ideas go back to the 
early theories on equity (Adams, 1966; Messick & Cook, 1983), whereby people are considered 
to be rationally weigh potential gains to one’s own investments in an exchange. Judgements of 
authority resource distributions, in this perspective, are underpinned by the crude input-output 
exchanges. As De Dreu and Gross acknowledge, attacks tend to be less coordinated and, in turn, 
riskier; having another danger relating to the subsequent sanction could indeed decrease the 
likelihood of an attack. Thus, if instrumental motives were the sole basis for complying with 
authorities then people would comply when the promise of rewards and threat of sanctions are 
such that compliance maximises benefits (or minimises loss).  
 
But are authorities simply sources of rewards and punishments? Tyler and colleagues have long 
argued that people obey authorities that treat them fairly for relational rather than instrumental 
reasons; such fair and respectful treatment tells them something about their social standing in the 
society (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Similarly, the threat of sanctions alters not only the cost-benefit 
implications of an action but also our understanding of the relevant social relationships. For 
example, through being forced to follow a course of action against our will we may come to see 
our relationship with an authority as unequal and conflictual, which in turn will make it difficult for 
the authority to subsequently appeal to a sense of duty to obey (Turner, 2005). Moreover, if 
attack behaviour serves to enact a group identity and understanding of the world, then sanctions 
will not necessarily counteract the motivation for it in the way that a simple cost-benefit account 
would suggest. For example, in the case of a terrorist group whose very raison d'être is rooted in 
the perceived illegitimacy of the status quo, sanctioning by the authorities would be entirely in line 
with the worldview from which their violence derives its meaning. Indeed, as Turner also points 
out, to be punished by an illegitimate authority could become a badge of honour, just as a 
promise of reward can be resented as an attempt to control through bribery. The point is that 
whether a reward or sanction serves to encourage or discourage a behaviour has as much to do 
with the social relationship within which they are administered as with any kind of inherent value. 
Moreover, to the extent that sanctions are felt by a wider group of people than those already 
engaged in conflict, there is the potential for escalation as is seen most clearly in studies of 
‘public order’ policing (e.g., Reicher, 1996). 
 
If the authority imposing a political sanction is viewed as being aligned or partial to an outgroup, 
then attackers are unlikely to identify with these decision-makers and will claim that this institution 
does not serve their interests (Pehrson, Devaney, Blaylock, & Bryan, 2017; Radburn, Stott, 
Bradford, & Robinson, 2016). Despite the risk of a sanction, lack of identification is a basis for 
rejecting unfavourable decisions (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). On the other hand, if the 
institutions are viewed by potential attackers as representative of a wider ingroup, then the 
picture is more optimistic. Because identification with an authority forms the basis for their 
legitimacy, it is more likely that even sanctions could be accepted so long as the authority 
represents a wider ingroup and is therefore legitimate. Thus, in settings where an authority is 
genuinely accepted as an ‘honest broker’ in managing competing intergroup interests, and thus 
able to secure the interests and loyalty of multiple parties by keeping the peace, then it does 
indeed have an important role to place in minimizing attack whether between individuals or 
groups. On the other hand, when the fate of the group is on the line and ingroup authorities act in 
a way that is seen as partisan, sanctioning can have devastating effects. Processes underpinning 
identification with authorities are dynamic and thus, even where an authority is initially viewed as 
part of an ingroup, sanctioning may well disrupt this (Radburn & Stott, 2018). 
 
Taking these insights into account, we would like to extend the implications of De Dreu and Gross 
by adding that policymakers wishing to discuss the effectiveness of political sanctioning in 
discouraging attacks should carefully assess the source or the institution of the sanctioning 
(whether it is understood by the targets of sanction to be representative of ingroup, outgroup or 
superordinate interests) and how the sanctioning itself would affect this. Ultimately, efforts to 
foster high levels of identification with the political authorities should be deployed to ensure that 
political sanctioning does not fail and even intensifies the desire to attack. 
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